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NCAA RULES ENFORCEMENT: MISSOURI,
ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTION, AND IMPOSING
PENALTIES IN AN AGE OF “REFORM”
Jerry R. Parkinson*
NCAA infractions committees recently decided a case involving academic misconduct at the University of Missouri. Critics have contended that penalties imposed on the university in that case were harsh,
unfair, and inconsistent with penalties imposed in other infractions
cases. The author examines the decisions in the Missouri case and compares those decisions to other recent cases involving academic misconduct. He concludes that the penalties imposed on Missouri are easily
defensible under current NCAA bylaws, but also contends that the
NCAA’s use of alternative methods of resolving major infractions cases
opens the door to potential penalty inconsistency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I’ve been covering the NCAA a long time. I started as an investigative reporter dealing with NCAA issues. I say that to say this — in
all the years that I’ve watched, studied and reported on the NCAA, I
think that this is the most outrageous penalty I’ve ever seen. There’s
no justification for it. There’s no rhyme or reason. The longer I’ve
thought about this and the more I’ve read about it and spoken to people at Mizzou and elsewhere, the more sickened I am by it . . . . To
penalize this football team for that, it’s not only reprehensible, but it
shows why people genuinely hate the NCAA.1

The quotation above is from Paul Finebaum, a sports journalist and media personality now working for the SEC (Southeastern Conference)
Network.2 His remarks in the summer of 2019 came on the heels of a
major infractions case involving the University of Missouri, Columbia
(Mizzou).3 Finebaum’s connections with the SEC, whose membership
includes the University of Missouri,4 may have influenced his opinion,
along with his conversations with “people at Mizzou,” who naturally
would be opposed to harsh NCAA sanctions on themselves. Nonetheless, Finebaum is a highly respected commentator, and his words are extraordinary, so they bear further examination. What is the “that” for
which the University of Missouri football team was so unfairly penalized?
II. THE MISSOURI INFRACTIONS CASE
The facts of the Missouri infractions case are straightforward. In
2015-2016, an academic tutor working for the University of Missouri
athletics department completed and submitted academic work for twelve
student-athletes.5 “Simply stated,” in the words of the NCAA Division
I Committee on Infractions (COI), “she did their work.”6 For some student-athletes, she completed individual homework assignments, quizzes,
1. SDS Staff, Paul Finebaum on Mizzou bowl ban: ‘The most outrageous penalty I’ve
ever seen,’ SATURDAY DOWN SOUTH, https://www.saturdaydownsouth.com/mizzou-football/paul-finebaum-on-mizzou-bowl-ban-the-most-outrageous-penalty-ive-ever-seen/ (last
visited Aug. 23, 2020).
2. Id.
3. See id.; see also GASN Sports, Paul Finebaum sounds off on NCAA sanctions,
YOUTUBE (July 18, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SsXtD8bu5U (discussing
Mizzou and its postseason ban in an interview with GASN Sports).
4. See University of Missouri, SEC NETWORK, https://www.secsports.com/school/missouri-tigers (last visited Aug. 23, 2020).
5. NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI,
COLUMBIA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS DECISION 1 (2019), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102744 [hereinafter NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION].
6. Id.
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or exams.7 For one student-athlete, she essentially completed the entire
course.8 For two others, the tutor helped to complete a math placement
exam so the student-athletes would not be forced into a remedial math
course.9 In all instances, the tutor engaged in academic misconduct;10
tutors may assist students in completing their own work, but tutors may
not do the work themselves.
I served on the NCAA’s Division I COI from 2000-2010. In those
days, we referred to such conduct as academic fraud, and academic fraud
was “considered by the committee to be among the most egregious of
NCAA violations.”11 Academic fraud goes directly to the heart of institutional integrity, consequently the NCAA leadership had made it abundantly clear that schools whose employees committed academic fraud
on behalf of student-athletes would receive harsh penalties.12
The membership still believes that. Since 2013, NCAA violations
have been classified according to level of severity, from “Level I” violations that are the most serious to “Level IV” violations that are relatively minor.13 Under NCAA bylaws, Level I violations are “severe
breach[es] of conduct . . . that seriously undermine or threaten the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model.”14 The bylaws specifically list academic misconduct, similar to the kind committed by the tutor at the
University of Missouri, as an example of a Level I violation.15
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 1, 14 (2009), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102310. Public COI decisions used to be called “reports,” but in 2013 they
were officially relabeled as “decisions.”
12. See, e.g., Press Release, Dr. Myles Brand, Leadership and Challenges: The Roles of
Intercollegiate Athletics in the University (Jan. 12, 2008), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2008/Announcements/Myles%2BBrands%2B2008%2BState%2Bof%2Bthe%2BAssociation%2BSpeech.html (“Academic fraud violates the fundamental bond that links intercollegiate athletics to higher education and should be dealt with aggressively and harshly.”);
NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, TWIN CITIES
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 3 (2000), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102169 (“[A]cademic fraud . . . undermined the bedrock foundation of a university
and . . . damaged the academic integrity of the institution.”) [hereinafter NCAA MINNESOTA
INFRACTIONS REPORT].
13. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 DIVISION I MANUAL, § 19.1
(2019) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]; New Violation Structure Introduced, NCAA (Aug. 1,
2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/new-violationstructure-introduced (The NCAA defines Level IV violations as those that are “inadvertent
and isolated, technical in nature and result in a negligible, if any, competitive advantage.”).
14. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.1.
15. Id. § 19.1.1. Prior to the 2013 bylaw changes, the infractions committee typically
used the phrase “academic fraud” to describe cheating in an academic setting. See, e.g., NCAA
MINNESOTA INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 12, at 3 (referring to “academic fraud”). The
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When University of Missouri representatives appeared before a
panel of the infractions committee to address the violations, they surely
knew that serious penalties were a possibility. The facts were not in
dispute—relatively extensive academic misconduct had occurred.16 Nor
could the University of Missouri contest the fact that this was a Level I
case, which carried with it the most significant penalties.
However, the level of penalties the University of Missouri faced
depended on a wide range of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
enumerated in the NCAA bylaws which the COI must consider.17 In
weighing all of the circumstances, the committee categorizes each case
as an “Aggravated” case (in which aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances), a “Standard” case (in which the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances are in relative balance—“generally of
equal weight”), or a “Mitigated” case (in which mitigating circumstances
outweigh aggravating circumstances).18
The bylaw directives were introduced in 2013 as part of a broader
effort by the NCAA membership to limit the COI’s discretion in assessing penalties. Once a case is labeled—for example, a “Level IStandard” case—it is plugged into a “penalty matrix” that prescribes a
relatively narrow range of penalties for each label.19 For example, one
of the so-called “core” penalties prescribed in the matrix for a Level IStandard case is a postseason ban of one to two years.20 By contrast, a

bylaws since 2013 have used the term “misconduct” rather than “fraud.” NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 13, § 14.02.1. In this article, I use “academic fraud” to describe cheating prior to
the 2013 bylaw revisions and “academic misconduct” for cases decided after the revisions.
16. Twelve student-athletes is actually quite a few. I argued a case on appeal in the early
2000s in which academic fraud on behalf of two student-athletes resulted in a ban on postseason competition. See NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 3-4, 16-18 (2002),
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102235 [hereinafter NCAA CALBERKELEY INFRACTIONS REPORT]. Other aggravating factors, including a lack of institutional
control and repeat-violator status, also played a role in the penalties. See id.
17. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 19.9.3, 19.9.4.
18. Id. § 19.9.2.
19. Id. § 19.9.5, fig.19-1.
20. Id. In essence, “core” penalties are presumptive. The bylaws state that once the COI
hearing panel classifies a case as aggravated, standard, or mitigated, it “shall prescribe” the
corresponding core penalties set forth in Figure 19-1. Id. § 19.9.5. The panel may depart from
the core penalties if “extenuating circumstances are found” and the panel explains in its decision the basis for the departure. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.9.6. The COI panel also
may prescribe additional penalties not included among the core. Id. § 19.9.7. The 2013 bylaw
changes were based on recommendations of an NCAA “enforcement working group.” NCAA
WORKING GROUP ON COLLEGIATE MODEL - ENFORCEMENT, FINAL REPORT (2012),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Report_Final_101112.pdf. That group’s final report
in 2012 suggested that core penalties were “those (1) identified by the membership as most
effectively deterring serious rules violations, and/or (2) identified by the [working] group as
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Level-I Mitigated case calls for either no postseason ban or a ban of one
year.21 Thus, a school like Missouri, which seeks to avoid a postseason
ban, has a strong incentive to try to convince the COI that its case is a
“mitigated” case rather than a “standard” case.
That was precisely the scenario that played out in the Missouri case.
The university contended that its academic misconduct case was a Level
I-Mitigated rather than a Level I-Standard.22 Unfortunately for Missouri,
the classification on which the COI panel that heard the case ultimately
landed was the latter.23 One point of contention in the Missouri case was
the number of mitigating factors that applied.24 Missouri asserted that it
should get the benefit of two factors enumerated in the bylaws: (1)
“prompt self-detection and self-disclosure of the violations,” and (2)
“implementation of a system of compliance methods designed to ensure
rules compliance and satisfaction of institutional/coaches’ control standards.”25
The COI panel disagreed. With respect to the first factor, the tutor
essentially turned herself in; the university did not “self-detect” the violations, even though it did “self-disclose” to the NCAA after the violations became known.26 The COI panel also concluded that the second
factor did not apply.27 The second factor only applies when the compliance system in place at the time of the violations led to detection of the
violations.28 Again, the university did not detect the violations through
its compliance system; the violations continued for a year and may never
have been discovered had the tutor not come forward to report her
wrongdoing.29
In an interesting twist, the University of Missouri initially tried to
resolve its infractions case through the NCAA’s “summary disposition”
process.30 This process, which has been available for many years, can
be used when the offending school and the NCAA enforcement staff
agree on the facts.31 They can then present their case to the infractions
those that historically have best addressed the gravity of the violations involved in infractions
cases.” Id.
21. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19, fig.19-1. There are no partial-year bans; the
penalty would be either no ban at all or a one-year ban.
22. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 13.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id.; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 19.9.4(a), 19.9.4(e).
26. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 12.
27. Id. at 12-13.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2.
31. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.6.
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committee for disposition without a hearing.32 The committee may reject this “summary” disposition on a variety of grounds, and even if it
accepts the case for disposition without a hearing, it still decides the penalties, which are appealable if the university disagrees with them.33
In the Missouri case, the COI panel rejected the proposed summary
disposition in part because the tutor was not included as a party to the
proceedings.34 The NCAA enforcement staff did not include the tutor
because she threatened to breach the confidentiality of the proceedings.35
The COI panel responded that “[t]hreats . . . should not serve as a shield
from accountability,”36 and determined that she was an indispensable
party to the proceedings in light of her central role in the academic misconduct.37
Perhaps even more interesting in the summary disposition process
was the University of Missouri’s concession that the case was either a
“low-end (tending toward mitigated) standard” case or an “upper-end
mitigated” case despite insisting later that it was only a Level I-Mitigated
case.38 In its ultimate decision, following its rejection of the summary
disposition and its conduct of a formal hearing, the COI panel “agree[d]
with Missouri’s original analysis.”39 In other words, the panel held the
University to its word that it was either a “low-end Level I-Standard”
case or an “upper-end Level I-Mitigated” case.40 Why does it matter?
Because classification as either a “low-end standard” or an “upper-end
mitigated” case puts one squarely within that part of the penalty matrix
that includes as a “core” penalty a one-year postseason ban.41
If all of this sounds formulaic, that’s because it is. The classification of cases, enumeration of specific aggravating and mitigating factors,
and a prescribed penalty matrix represent a significant departure from a
more flexible approach the COI employed prior to 2013.42 While the
committee still considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances

32. What is a Summary Disposition?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/whatsummary-disposition (last visited Aug. 29, 2020); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.6.
33. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.6.4.
34. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 2.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2, 10.
38. Id. at 13.
39. Id.
40. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 13.
41. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19, fig.19-1.
42. Compare NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2012-2013 DIVISION I MANUAL
ART. 19 [hereinafter 2012-13 NCAA MANUAL] (including none of these provisions), with
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.
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prior to 2013, it was not tethered to the bylaws as the committee is now.43
Indeed, in defending its decisions on appeal, the pre-2013 COI regularly
argued that its penalty determinations could not be formulaic due to the
unique nature of each case.44
In the end, the COI in the Missouri case leveled serious sanctions
on the University, including significant scholarship reductions in three
sports—football, baseball, and softball (the student-athletes involved in
the academic misconduct were spread among those three sports)—and
the penalty that really mattered the most to the university, a one-year
postseason ban in all three sports.45 That is, in none of the three sports
could student-athletes compete in postseason competitions, such as bowl
games in football or the College World Series in baseball or softball.
Missouri officials predictably reacted with outrage. After pronouncing himself “shocked and dismayed” by the decision,46 the university’s athletics director, Jim Sterk, launched a “Make It Right” campaign, which included billboards and a website encouraging alumni and
friends to voice their own outrage, even urging Missouri fans to “call
and e-mail state and federal legislators as they help us take a stand
against these penalties.”47 University of Missouri officials appealed the

43. NCAA DIVISION I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMMITTEE, UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS APPEALS REPORT 19 (1995), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102462 [hereinafter NCAA MISSISSIPPI APPEALS REPORT].
44. I prepared twenty-eight appellate responses on behalf of the COI during my tenure
on the committee from 2000-2010, and this was a standard argument I made in those responses. In part that position was based on guidance provided by the Infractions Appeals
Committee, a five-member body that reviews decisions of the COI. See id. at 15 (“Because
each case presents its own facts and circumstances, this comparison [to other cases] cannot be
made by mechanically applying a formula.”).
45. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 14-18. One of the reasons
the postseason ban received so much attention is because of the financial hit on the university
that resulted from the sanction. Pursuant to an SEC rule, the postseason ban precluded Mizzou
from sharing in the conference’s bowl revenue, a loss in the millions of dollars. See Dennis
Dodd & Ben Kercheval, Missouri incensed as bowl ban upheld, lawyer insists cooperating
with NCAA not worthwhile, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 27, 2019, 12:31 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/missouri-incensed-as-bowl-ban-upheldlawyer-insists-cooperating-with-ncaa-not-worthwhile/ (estimating a loss of $8-10 million);
Liam Quinn, Costly decision: Missouri’s bottom line takes hit from NCAA sanctions,
MISSOURIAN (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.columbiamissourian.com/sports/mizzou_football/costly-decision-missouri-s-bottom-line-takes-hit-from-ncaa/article_ffaa1c44-100d11ea-a6ea-1fd1d45dcf6d.html.
46. Dave Matter, Mizzou ‘shocked and dismayed’ by NCAA punishment, will appeal severe sanctions, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/sports/college/mizzou/mizzou-shocked-and-dismayed-by-ncaa-punishment-willappeal-severe-sanctions/article_b8b12f21-6675-5d6a-89cf-3a05848ba6bd.html.
47. MAKE IT RIGHT, https://mutigers.com/feature/MakeItRight (last visited Aug. 22,
2020); Eli Lederman, From the ashes of ‘Make It Right,’ a larger conversation rises,
MISSOURIAN (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.columbiamissourian.com/sports/from-the-ashes-
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COI decision,48 and throughout a frustratingly long appeal process49 continued to voice their optimism that at least some of the sanctions, including the postseason bans, would be overturned by the Infractions Appeals
Committee.50
However, the infractions committee’s penalties are not shocking to
anyone with a familiarity of the NCAA process. Again, this is a formulaic process and classification of an infractions case is critical in determining penalties because classification will place the case in the appropriate position in the penalty matrix. In the Missouri case, everyone,
including University of Missouri representatives, agreed that the case
was at the most serious level—Level I—because academic misconduct
was involved.51 At the initial summary judgment stage, Missouri characterized the case as either “low-end Level I-Standard” or “upper-end
Level I-Mitigated.”52 Even though Missouri later backed away from
Level I-Standard classification, the COI retains latitude in its own classification.53 As the appeals committee later noted, “the panel does have
the discretion and authority to disagree with the parties’ position on level
and classification and thus can make its own determination of such.”54
The COI panel exercised that discretion and authority, and stuck with its
own view that the case was a Level I-Standard.55
What is lost in most commentary on the Missouri case is that the
COI panel met the university at least halfway on the classification issue.
After noting a “significant overlap” in penalty ranges in the matrix for
low-end standard and upper-end mitigated cases, “the panel intentionally
of-make-it-right-a-larger-conversation-rises/article_8e013006-1160-11ea-ba83b37a63bbde82.html.
48. Dave Matter, Mizzou files NCAA appeal, argues sanctions could have ‘chilling effect,’ ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/sports/college/mizzou/mizzou-files-ncaa-appeal-argues-sanctions-could-have-chilling-effect/article_f4d5c242-3e28-5d9e-b4aa-3ab8bff153df.html.
49. See Dodd & Kercheval, supra note 45 (noting Mizzou’s increasing frustration as the
appeal took more than twice the time for ultimate resolution as typical appeals).
50. Eric Blum, Mizzou AD remains confident about NCAA appeal, COLUMBIA DAILY
TRIB. (June 22, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.columbiatribune.com/sports/20190622/mizzou-ad-remains-confident-about-ncaa-appeal. Experts interviewed by the campus newspaper,
however, were not so optimistic about success on appeal. Bennett Durando, Experts: ‘Tough
road ahead’ if MU wants to overturn NCAA sanctions in appeal, MISSOURIAN (Feb. 2, 2019),
https://www.columbiamissourian.com/sports/mizzou_football/experts-tough-road-ahead-ifmu-wants-to-overturn-ncaa/article_99fbc1c2-2751-11e9-b230-6fb430e98cdc.html.
51. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 13.
52. Id.
53. See NCAA DIVISION I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMMITTEE, UNIVERSITY OF
MISSOURI, COLUMBIA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS APPEALS DECISION 7 (2019),
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102806
[hereinafter
NCAA
MISSOURI APPEALS DECISION].
54. Id.
55. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 13-14.
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looked to prescribing the lowest penalties associated with Level I-Standard ranges.”56 Moreover, it explicitly chose not to ascribe the tutor’s
aggravating factors to the university, despite the tutor in the Missouri
case operating within the scope of her employment when she committed
the academic misconduct violations.57 The COI acknowledged that infractions cases “historically have had symmetry between aggravating
and mitigating factors for institutions and involved individuals when involved individuals are operating as institutional employees—particularly when involved individuals are operating within the scope of their
employment.”58 However, despite the fact the tutor’s aggravating factors were more numerous than the university’s, the panel, with an ambiguous remark about “the nature of the record in this case,” chose not
to tag the university with her aggravators.59
A close reading of the COI decision, then, indicates that the panel
took considerable care in fashioning its classification of the Missouri
case and, at least in some respects, gave the institution the benefit of the
doubt. The one-year postseason ban and other penalties were within the
range dictated by the penalty matrix even if the case were classified as
Level I-Mitigated as Missouri wanted.60 The Infractions Appeals Committee (IAC) noted this fact twice in its written decision.61
The COI is not strictly bound by the penalty matrix prescribed in
the bylaws, but there certainly is a strong presumption that it follows the
guidelines: “the hearing panel shall prescribe core penalties from the
ranges set forth . . . . The panel may depart from the core penalties only
as set forth in Bylaw 19.9.6.”62 Bylaw 19.9.6 allows departure from the
matrix only if the COI panel finds “extenuating circumstances” and explains the basis for its departure in its written decision.63
56. Id. at 13.
57. Id. at 11-12.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id. at 11-12. The panel recognized that this was a departure from historical practice
and added the following: “Because this case is unique, it should not be cited as precedent in
this limited regard.” Id. at 12.
60. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19, fig.19-1.
61. NCAA MISSOURI APPEALS DECISION, supra note 53, at 7, 9 n.10.
62. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.9.5 (emphasis added).
63. Id. § 19.9.6. Extenuating circumstances can run the gamut. See, e.g., NCAA
DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS
DECISION 10-11 (2017), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102608
(departing downward from penalty matrix because underlying recruiting violation was Level
II, not Level I, and because the university’s swift action prompted coach’s resignation);
NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS DECISION 16 (2016), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102580 (departing upward from penalty matrix because of significant academic misconduct and a period of probation would provide NCAA “additional time for oversight and
monitoring”).
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It likewise should have been no surprise that the IAC upheld the
Missouri penalties on appeal. When application of the penalty matrix is
coupled with the IAC’s “abuse of discretion” standard of review,64 it
would be a tall order for an appeals committee—even one as active as
the IAC65—to conclude that the COI panel abused its discretion when
applying the penalty guidelines set forth in the bylaws.66 And the IAC
said as much: it would decline “to delineate any penalty within the appropriate matrix options as an abuse of discretion absent a clearly arbitrary” panel decision.67
Nonetheless, University of Missouri officials reacted to the IAC decision in much the same way as they reacted to the COI decision—with
anger and indignation. Athletics director Jim Sterk, after expressing disappointment and shock, said, “Now I am just angry . . . . The NCAA has
proven again it cannot effectively serve its membership and the studentathletes it is supposed to protect. The decision today is just wrong.”68
University chancellor Alexander Cartwright added that it is debatable
whether the IAC decision “is currently encouraging or discouraging
compliance and integrity.”69 Mun Choi, the president of the University
of Missouri System, also felt compelled to chime in: “I could not be more
upset with this decision. Mizzou supporters across the state and nation
have every reason to be outraged, and college sports fans across the
country should be concerned about this decision.”70
Even though both the COI and IAC decisions—and the penalties—
are eminently supportable both by the bylaws and by comparison with
64. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.10.1.1 (stating IAC may set aside penalties
only on abuse of discretion).
65. See JERRY PARKINSON, INFRACTIONS: RULE VIOLATIONS, UNETHICAL CONDUCT,
AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE NCAA 149-52 (2019) (describing how often the IAC granted
appellants penalty relief during the 2000’s, including one several-year period in which appellants received relief in half of appealed cases). A look at the NCAA’s major-case database
shows that the IAC has continued to be quite active in overturning penalties during the last
decade.
Major
Infractions
Search
Results,
NCAA
LSDBI,
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search?types=major&q= (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
66. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.10.1.1.
67. NCAA MISSOURI APPEALS DECISION, supra note 53, at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting
NCAA DIVISION I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMMITTEE, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS APPEALS DECISION 4 (2016), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102545).
68. Nick Kelly, No relief: NCAA denies Missouri’s appeal, upholds all sanctions,
MISSOURIAN (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.columbiamissourian.com/sports/mizzou_football/no-relief-ncaa-denies-missouri-s-appeal-upholds-all-sanctions/article_37e74a00-107211ea-b0bf-0b08757dda07.html.
69. Id.
70. Dave Matter, NCAA denies Mizzou’s appeal, upholds postseason ban and other sanctions, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/sports/college/mizzou/ncaa-denies-mizzous-appeal-upholds-postseason-ban-and-other-sanctions/article_10f0a157-a2e3-5c4f-af2c-655cabc4f9f3.html.
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other cases involving academic misconduct,71 some prior case law makes
these officials’ visceral reaction understandable at some level. In particular, the University of North Carolina (UNC) decision of 201772 is the
case by which every school with academic misconduct wants to be measured. For Missouri it’s reasonable for officials to say, “UNC got nothing
and we get a postseason ban?!”
III. ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT AND A COMPARISON TO UNC
The NCAA opened itself to legitimate criticism when the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill received no penalties at the end of
a years-long process involving rampant academic fraud at the school.73
A university-commissioned investigation into the matter (one of many
investigations) found that over 3,000 students received fraudulent academic credit in a scheme that spanned nearly two decades.74 The scheme
involved over a thousand bogus independent studies and scores of makebelieve lecture courses.75 Roughly half of the students who “benefitted”
from the scheme were student-athletes, even though student-athletes
comprised only about four percent of the UNC undergraduate student
body.76
It is not an exaggeration to say that the UNC case was the biggest
academic fraud case in NCAA history. Yet as the case was being decided, the NCAA was in the process of changing its academic fraud bylaws, for the first time in over thirty years.77 At the risk of oversimplification, the principal goal of the changes was to shift responsibility for
academic misconduct to individual NCAA member institutions, which
had for years asserted that academic matters were within their control,
71. See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 10.1, 10.01.1, 16.11.2.1; NCAA
DIVISION I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMMITTEE, FORMER DIRECTOR OF MEN’S BASKETBALL
OPERATIONS, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE PUBLIC INFRACTIONS
APPEALS
DECISION
(2018),
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102665.
72. NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA
AT
CHAPEL
HILL
PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS
DECISION
(2017),
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102636.
73. See PARKINSON, supra note 65, at 263-64.
74. Id. at 244 (citing KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN, A. JOSEPH JAY III & COLLEEN DEPMAN
KUKOWSKI, INVESTIGATION OF IRREGULAR CLASSES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AFRICAN AND
AFRO-AMERICAN STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL,
CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP (Oct. 16, 2014)). The Wainstein report is available at Our Commitment: Taking Action and Moving Forward Together, UNIVERSITY OF
NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, https://carolinacommitment.unc.edu/reports-resources/
(last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
75. PARKINSON, supra note 65, at 244.
76. Id. at 244, 265.
77. Id. at 248, 255-56.
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not the NCAA’s.78 It was now up to the individual school to determine
whether academic misconduct had occurred, according to institutional
academic policies.79 And if a school determined that its own academic
policies were not violated, there was little the NCAA could do about it.80
In the UNC case, institutional representatives stood by the sham
courses that resulted in fraudulent academic credit, asserting that the university’s academic policies at the time did not prohibit what occurred.81
In contrast, the University of Missouri, upon learning of its tutor’s misconduct, promptly determined that it violated school policies on academic integrity.82 So for Missouri, which arguably acted more honestly
and honorably than UNC, this meant it was slapped with serious sanctions, including postseason bans, while UNC went merrily on its way.
Common sense suggests that the violations in the Missouri case, as
serious as they are, pale in comparison to the violations at UNC. When
viewed in that context, then, Missouri officials have every right to feel
aggrieved. But they also know the ground rules (the NCAA bylaws),
and if they are offended by the seemingly inconsistent results, their beef
should be with the NCAA legislation, which the NCAA membership (including the University of Missouri) approved, not with the COI or IAC,
which decided the case reasonably pursuant to applicable bylaws.
IV. MISSISSIPPI STATE AND NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION
Missouri got a double whammy when the COI decided another major infractions case while the Missouri case was on appeal. In August
2019, a COI panel reviewed an academic misconduct case at Mississippi
State University with facts remarkably similar to those in the Missouri
case—an athletics academic tutor did work in an online chemistry course
for eleven student-athletes.83 The tutor completed homework assignments and exams (in some cases, nearly the entire course) for studentathletes who did not do their own work.84
At first glance, the two cases—both involving roughly the same
level of academic misconduct—would seem headed toward similar

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 256-57.
See id. at 262-63.
PARKINSON, supra note 65, at 262.
NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 10.
NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY
NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION
(2019), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102786 [hereinafter NCAA MISSISSIPPI STATE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION]. In the
Mississippi State case, the tutor completed assignments “in exchange for cash payments” from
the student-athletes. Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 3-4.
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penalties. Yet Mississippi State received significantly lighter penalties,
including fewer scholarship and recruiting restrictions.85 Most importantly, at least from Missouri’s perspective, Mississippi State received no postseason ban.86 It did not take long for Missouri officials to
seize upon the decision and cry foul.87
However, three factors distinguish the two cases. First, the COI
credited Mississippi State with two additional mitigating factors.88 Indeed, the two factors that Missouri argued the COI should apply to its
case, but which the COI panel rejected, were applied to Mississippi
State: (1) prompt self-detection and self-disclosure, and (2) a compliance
system designed to ensure rules compliance.89 Recall that in the Missouri case the tutor came forward to report her own misconduct; the university did not “self-detect” the violation.90 In contrast, in the Mississippi State case, an academic advisor overheard an incriminating
conversation and reported it to a superior, who then reported the matter
to compliance officials.91 Thus, the misconduct was detected through
the school’s compliance system and promptly reported.92
However, it seems unlikely that these mitigators made the difference. Based on my experience with the COI, I can say with some confidence that the cases, in light of the nature and extent of the academic
fraud, would have been decided similarly, at least prior to 2010 and absent any of the distinguishing factors mentioned above. But in the Mississippi State case, a far more important factor was in play: the Mississippi State infractions case was decided pursuant to a new “negotiated
resolution” process in which the university and the NCAA enforcement
85. Compare id. at 7 (proposing penalties in the form of a reduction of two scholarships
and restricting official football recruiting visits to four), with NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS
DECISION, supra note 5, at 15 (proposing the following penalties: reduction of four scholarships—five percent of eighty-five allowable, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 15.5.6.1
(limit of eighty-five scholarships)—and seven official recruiting visits in football).
86. See Dave Matter, Sterk: NCAA ruling on Mississippi State shows Mizzou penalties
were ‘excessive, inconsistent,’ ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/sports/college/mizzou/sterk-ncaa-ruling-on-mississippi-state-shows-mizzou-penalties-were/article_3897875d-dd10-5bff-984d-30c829446707.html (no postseason ban on Mississippi State).
87. See id.
88. NCAA MISSISSIPPI STATE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION, supra note 83.
89. Id. at 6.
90. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 2.
91. NCAA MISSISSIPPI STATE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION, supra note 83, at 1. As of
mid-September 2020, the public report included in the NCAA major case database contains
an error, stating that “the tutor” reported the conversation. The report should read “the academic advisor.” An author of the report verified that the original negotiated resolution signed
by the parties included the correct designation. Telephone Interview with Larry Parkinson,
Member, Comm. on Infractions (Sept. 14, 2020).
92. NCAA MISSISSIPPI STATE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION, supra note 83, at 1.
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staff (the tutor did not cooperate) agreed on the facts, level of violations,
aggravating and mitigating factors, and penalties.93
The negotiated resolution process was added to the NCAA bylaws
in 2018.94 Mississippi State was one of the NCAA’s early tests of the
new process,95 and perhaps it was unfortunate that the case appeared to
be so similar to Missouri’s. The legislation permits streamlining of the
infractions process when the parties are in such agreement that a formal
hearing—or even a summary disposition—seems unnecessary.96 But
there is one substantial new element injected into the negotiated resolution that was not present before—the NCAA enforcement staff’s role in
the determination of penalties.97 Indeed, that is the major difference between the negotiated resolution and the summary disposition. In the latter process, the parties agree to the facts and the overall level of the case,
then present the case to the COI for review.98 The COI can accept or
reject the summary disposition, but in any event, the COI determines
penalties.99 In the new negotiated resolution process, the parties must
agree on the violations, level of those violations, and penalties before
the case is presented to the COI.100
In years past, determination of penalties was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Committee on Infractions (subject to review by the
IAC). The enforcement staff steered clear of penalties, expressing no
view on the penalties to be imposed. At appeal hearings, which nearly
always focus on penalties and rarely on fact findings, enforcement staff
representatives act essentially as observers, without an active role in the
proceedings.101
I fear that giving the enforcement staff this new penalty responsibility in negotiated resolutions is a recipe for inconsistency in penalties.
At first glance, this may seem not to be the case since the COI still
93. Id. at 3-11.
94. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.5.12.
95. The Mississippi State case was resolved on August 23, 2019. NCAA MISSISSIPPI
STATE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION, supra note 83, at 1.
96. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.5.12.
97. Id.
98. See id. § 19.6. An institution or individual charged with a violation, but not the enforcement staff, can propose penalties to the COI. See id. § 19.6.3.
99. Id. § 19.6.4.
100. Id.
§
19.5.12.1;
2018
Enforcement
Year
in
Review,
NCAA,
www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/2018-enforcement-year-review (last visited
Aug. 28, 2020) (explaining distinction between negotiated resolution and summary disposition).
101. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.10.5(d) (“Representatives from
the enforcement staff may participate during the appeal oral argument but such participation
shall be limited to the opportunity to provide information regarding perceived new information, errors, misstatements and omissions.”).
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reviews each agreement. In fact, in its explanation of the negotiated resolution process, the NCAA website says, “[t]he Division I Committee
on Infractions reviews the case to determine whether the resolution is in
the best interest of the NCAA and whether the agreed-upon penalties
are appropriate.”102 But this glosses over what the new bylaws really
state. In defining the COI’s scope of review, the relevant bylaw states
that a COI panel reviewing a case “shall only reject a negotiated resolution if it is not in the best interests of the Association or the agreed-upon
penalties are manifestly unreasonable pursuant to Bylaw 19.9 and Figure
19-1.”103 Bylaw 19.9 delineates aggravating and mitigating factors, and
Figure 19-1 is the penalty matrix.104
We know how this process played out in the Mississippi State case.
Despite being confronted with an academic misconduct case eerily similar to that of Missouri’s (whose postseason ban was currently on appeal), the COI panel was constrained by the resolution negotiated and
agreed upon by the enforcement staff and Mississippi State University.
Those parties had agreed that the case against the University was Level
I-Mitigated, and the agreed-upon penalties, which did not include a postseason ban, were within the range of “core penalties for Level I-Mitigated” cases.105 The penalty matrix for such cases prescribes either no
postseason ban or a ban of one year.106 Thus, the agreed-upon penalties
could hardly be “manifestly unreasonable.”107 So even if the COI believed that the Missouri and Mississippi State cases were identical, it was
constrained seriously by the contours of the negotiated resolution process.
In announcing negotiated resolution as a new means of resolving
major infractions cases, the NCAA media office said the process “uses
fewer resources and expedites review by the Division I Committee on
Infractions.”108 These are admirable goals, to be sure, but if the use of
alternative means of resolution results in inconsistent penalties for similar cases, the practice deserves reexamination. The new bylaws do state
that negotiated resolutions approved by the COI “have no precedential
value,”109 but I’m sure that provision is of little consolation to Missouri.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

2018 Enforcement Year in Review, supra note 100 (emphasis added).
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.5.12.2 (emphasis added).
See id. § 19.9, fig.19-1.
NCAA MISSISSIPPI STATE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION, supra note 83, at 3, 7-8, 12.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.9, fig.19-1.
See id. § 19.5.12.2.
2018 Enforcement Year in Review, supra note 100.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.5.12.4.
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V. HISTORY OF VIOLATIONS AND REPEAT VIOLATORS
To be clear, I am not contending that the Missouri and Mississippi
State cases were identical. While I do not believe the addition of two
modest mitigating factors in favor of Mississippi State should have
tipped the balance, there is a third distinguishing factor between the two
cases that may have caused the disparate outcomes. In addition to the
mitigating factors and the different resolution processes, one common
aggravating factor stands out in my mind. Both institutions have “a history of Level I, Level II or major violations.”110 That sounds relatively
innocuous, but a deeper examination may be in order.
In the “old days,” a postseason ban for Missouri would have been a
slam dunk. Not only did the case involve relatively extensive academic
misconduct, but Missouri was a repeat violator. Even a cursory look at
the NCAA’s major-case database reveals the effect of repeat-violator
status in the past.111 In its day, repeat-violator status carried enormous
weight, and every major infractions report ended with an admonition relating to the repeat-violator window.112
A repeat violator was an institution that had a major violation (now
classified as a Level I or Level II violation) within five years of a finding
of a major violation in a previous case.113 Any school that came before
the COI as a repeat violator knew that its penalties likely would be enhanced simply because of this status. The basic idea was that violators
who did not learn from recent past mistakes should receive an extra dose
of specific deterrence.
However, several years ago, “reforms” by NCAA leadership led to
the deletion of a specific repeat-violator bylaw; repeat-violator status is
110. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 11; NCAA MISSISSIPPI
STATE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION, supra note 83, at 5.
111. See, e.g., NCAA CAL-BERKELEY INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 16, at 16-17
(explaining that repeat-violator status played significant role in penalties); NCAA DIVISION I
COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, TUSCALOOSA PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS REPORT 29 (2002), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102231 (explaining that repeat-violator status played significant role in penalties).
112. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 120-21.
113. 2012-13 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 42. Because dated manuals are not easily accessible, one might more readily refer to COI cases decided when a repeat-violator bylaw still
existed. E.g., NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA,
LAS VEGAS PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 2 (2000), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102192 (“Due to the fact that the violations found in this case occurred
within five years of the starting date of penalties associated with the 1993 case, the institution
is considered a repeat violator and potentially subject to the penalties specified in Bylaw
19.6.2.3.2.”). Bylaw 19.6.2.3.2 included as a penalty “[t]he prohibition of some or all outside
competition in the sport involved in the latest major violation for one or two sports seasons”—
essentially the NCAA’s “death penalty.” Id. at 31; see also 2012-13 NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 42, § 19.5.2.1.2(a).
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now subsumed within the “history of violations” aggravator (which is
itself easy to get lost in a list of thirty-one enumerated aggravating and
mitigating factors).114 I fear that these legislative changes have led to
the death of the repeat violator, but that is a topic for another article.
Perhaps there is still life left in the repeat violator, which may help to
distinguish the Missouri and Mississippi State cases. Without mentioning the five-year window explicitly, the COI panel in the Missouri case
did include this one sentence in its decision: “the panel makes specific
note that Missouri now has had two Level I cases in less than three
years.”115 Missouri had a major case in men’s basketball in 2016—a
case that also resulted in a one-year postseason ban, in addition to other
substantial penalties.116 Indeed, in 2016 Missouri self-imposed a postseason ban, even though the COI ultimately determined that the principal
violations resulted in a Level I-Mitigated case!117
If one considers the schools’ overall “history of infractions,”
though, neither Missouri nor Mississippi State has much to brag about.
Missouri has had six major cases.118 Mississippi State has had seven119
and Mississippi State barely escaped repeat-violator status itself. Prior
to its 2019 case, Mississippi State’s last major case occurred in 2013,120
and the infractions report at that time included the usual repeat-violator
admonition: “Mississippi State shall be subject to the provisions of
NCAA Bylaw 19.5.2.3, concerning repeat violators, for a five-year period beginning on the effective date of the penalties in this case, June 7,
2013.”121 The academic misconduct in the school’s most recent case
began during the fall semester of 2018,122 just outside the five-year window. So perhaps the two schools were essentially on the same level with
114. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.9. I use quotation marks around the word
“reforms” because I believe that many of the enforcement process changes NCAA President
Emmert has spearheaded in the last decade have been ill-advised, even if well-intended. In
addition to some of the changes addressed in this article, such as the creation of a new “independent” resolution track for “complex” infractions cases, see infra text accompanying notes
123-45, I have addressed in my book other changes that I view with skepticism. See, e.g.,
PARKINSON, supra note 65, at 106-10 (case levels and penalty structure), 221-25 (expansion
of COI), 248-64 (academic misconduct legislation).
115. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 13.
116. NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI,
COLUMBIA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS DECISION (2016), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102548.
117. Id. at 11-12.
118. See NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 1 n.2.
119. See NCAA DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, MISSISSIPPI STATE
UNIVERSITY
PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS
REPORT
1
n.1
(2013),
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102413.
120. Id. at 1.
121. Id. at 16-17.
122. NCAA MISSISSIPPI STATE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION, supra note 83, at 1 n.2.
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respect to their history of infractions, and the only true distinguishing
factor was the method of resolution—a negotiated resolution for Mississippi State and a regular COI hearing process for Missouri.
VI. INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTABILITY RESOLUTION PROCESS
If one reads Mississippi State’s negotiated resolution carefully, another interesting provision presents itself: “Additionally, the parties
acknowledge that this negotiated resolution will not be binding if the
case is referred to the independent accountability resolution process (Bylaw 19.11).”123 The “Independent Accountability Resolution Process”
(IARP) took effect on August 1, 2019.124 It is an entirely new enforcement scheme that utilizes “independent investigators, advocates, and decision-makers” in the processing of a major infractions case.125 In other
words, the key players in this new process are “independent” of the usual
participants. The NCAA enforcement staff’s typical roles in investigating an infractions case and presenting evidence before the COI are
largely supplanted by “external investigators and advocates with no
school or conference affiliations.”126 Similarly, the COI is left out of the
process. A new “Independent Resolution Panel” of five members, drawn
from a larger group of fifteen members “with legal, higher education
and/or sports backgrounds,” will hear the case, determine whether rule
violations have occurred, and impose penalties.127
The IARP is another of the NCAA leadership’s “reforms” that may
result in more headaches than improvements. The process was created,
relatively hastily, following recommendations by the Commission on
College Basketball.128 NCAA President Mark Emmert appointed the
commission in 2017 in response to a series of federal criminal indictments alleging, in part, illegal cash payments to high school basketball
prospects and their families to steer the prospects to particular NCAA
institutions.129 After about a six-month review of the matter, the
123. Id. at 11.
124. New independent infractions process launches, NCAA (Aug. 1, 2019, 1:41 PM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/new-independent-infractions-process-launches.
125. Id.
126. Independent Accountability Resolution Process, IARPCC (2020), https://iarpcc.org/.
The “complex case unit” assigned to investigation and advocacy under the IARP process will
include “one member of the enforcement staff,” so the enforcement staff will continue to have
at least a modest role. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Coaches, Adidas Executive Face Charges; Pitino’s Program
Implicated, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/sports/ncaaadidas-bribery.html; NCAA Media Center, Statement From President Mark Emmert on the
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commission, chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, recommended an “independent” process for “complex” infractions
cases.130 As a result, the IARP was created and designed “to minimize
perceived conflicts of interest and to add different perspectives to the
review of infractions matters.”131
The addition of yet another means of resolving major infractions
cases invites inconsistency in penalties. Few of the individuals appointed to any of the IARP groups—including the “complex case unit”
of investigators and advocates, and the fifteen-member group from
which Independent Resolution Panels will be drawn—have experience
in infractions matters.132 Some NCAA-watchers wondered if the process
ever would be used because institutions seemingly would be unwilling
to risk being guinea pigs for an untested enforcement regime.133 Use of
the new process may be particularly unappealing when one of the significant components of the IARP is to deny an institutional participant the
right to an appeal if it disagrees with findings or penalties: “Decisions
issued by the Independent Resolution Panel are final and not subject to
appeal or further review.”134
However, in March 2020, the NCAA announced that an infractions
case involving the University of Memphis will be resolved through the
IARP.135 This will be the first test of the process, and it promises to be
interesting, though we apparently will know few details until the case is
finally resolved. In making its announcement, the NCAA said:
Formation of a Commission on College Basketball, NCAA (Oct. 11, 2017, 1:55 PM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/statement-president-mark-emmertformation-commission-college-basketball.
130. COMMISSION ON COLLEGE BASKETBALL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
ADDRESS THE ISSUES FACING COLLEGIATE BASKETBALL
9-10
(2018),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018CCBReportFinal_web_20180501.pdf;
Independent Accountability Resolution Process, supra note 126.
131. New independent infractions process launches, supra note 124.
132. Independent Accountability Resolution Process, supra note 126 (“View the Committee Roster”); Infractions Referral Committee, IARPCC (2020), https://iarpcc.org (“View the
Committee Roster”); Complex Case Unit, IARPCC (2020), https://iarpcc.org; Independent
Resolution Panel, IARPCC (2020), https://iarpcc.org (“View the Panel Roster”).
133. See, e.g., Pat Forde, NCAA, Memphis Enter Uncharted Territory as Tigers’ James
Wiseman Decision Comes Home to Roost, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 4, 2020),
https://www.si.com/college/2020/03/04/memphis-james-wiseman-investigation-ncaa (“The
general belief within the NCAA membership is that schools would be reluctant to request this
resolution because of the unknown—nobody has ever been down this road before.”).
134. Independent Accountability Resolution Process, supra note 126; see also NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.11.6.2 (“Any decision by a hearing panel shall be final, binding
and conclusive, and shall not be subject to further review by any governance body.”).
135. Memphis’ infractions case will be resolved through the Independent Accountability
Resolution Process, NCAA (Mar. 4, 2020, 12:15 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/memphis-infractions-case-will-be-resolved-through-independent-accountability-resolution-process.

78

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

“Consistent with rules and procedures governing the process, details
about the matter will remain confidential until the Independent Resolution Panel releases its decision.”136
The veil of secrecy is puzzling. If the NCAA wishes to have IARP
buy-in, one might think a policy of transparency would serve its purposes more readily. We don’t know, for example, if the University of
Memphis requested IARP resolution, and if so, why. The process can
be initiated by a request from the school, the NCAA’s Vice President of
Enforcement, or the chair of the Division I COI.137 If the University of
Memphis didn’t make the request, why would it be made by the enforcement VP, whose investigative and advocacy roles are supplanted by “independent” investigators and advocates? Similarly, what incentive
would the COI have to request the IARP when the process takes it completely out of the picture?
Moreover, we don’t know why the Infractions Referral Committee,
a newly constituted body that votes to approve or reject requests for referral of cases to the IARP,138 decided that the University of Memphis
case was suitable for resolution by this new process. Indeed, we don’t
even know the nature of the Memphis case, although numerous commentators have speculated on it.139 The process is designed to resolve
“complex” cases,140 but what is it about Memphis that makes the case
complex? In my ten-year experience on the COI, I’m not sure I ever saw
a complex case. Some cases involved egregious or extensive violations,
but little is complex, for example, about institutional representatives
making cash payments to recruits. Yet in its announcement of the IARP,
136. Id.
137. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.11.3.2.1.
138. Id. §§ 19.11.2.2.5, 19.11.3.
139. See, e.g., Forde, supra note 133; Dana O’Neil, What it means that Memphis’ NCAA
case is headed to the IARP, ATHLETIC (Mar. 4, 2020), https://theathletic.com/1653997/2020/03/04/what-it-means-that-memphis-ncaa-case-is-headed-to-theiarp/. Both Forde and O’Neil assume the case revolves around the University of Memphis’
decision to allow student-athlete James Wiseman to compete in three men’s basketball games
during the fall of 2019, despite a pending NCAA investigation into whether Wiseman and his
family had received improper recruiting inducements from Memphis head coach Penny Hardaway. Both Forde and O’Neil are superb sportswriters, but their columns also show how confusing the new IARP process can be. Both writers, in attempting to explain how the process
will work, assert that independent advocates from the complex case unit will present the case
to the Independent Resolution Panel on behalf of the University of Memphis. (“[A]n independent defense team . . . will advocate for the school in place of outside counsel hired by the
university.” Forde, supra note 133. The independent “advocate” of the complex case unit “acts
. . . as the defense.” O’Neil, supra note 139.) Surely the process does not allow the NCAA to
deny an institution its right to have counsel of its own choosing, particularly if the school did
not request referral of its case to the IARP.
140. See supra text accompanying note 130; New independent infractions process
launches, supra note 124.
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the NCAA media center suggested that even “the possibility of major
penalties” could render a case complex.141 When will that not be the
case? Every Level I and Level II case carries with it the possibility of
major penalties.142
Regardless of how the Memphis case, or any other IARP-resolved
case, turns out, inconsistency in penalties remains a potential problem.143
Anytime the determination of penalties is left to alternative decisionmakers—including the enforcement staff now determining penalties
in a negotiated resolution—consistency is jeopardized.
In its written decision in the Missouri case, the Infractions Appeals
Committee made special note of the potential for inconsistency and confusion “given the varying processes and approaches for resolving infractions issues.”144 As the IAC noted, there are now four different methods
of resolving major infractions cases—negotiated resolution, summary
disposition, COI hearings, and the IARP process.145 Each of these methods employs a different approach to fact-finding and penalty determination.
VII. PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF PRIOR DECISIONS
The NCAA membership seemingly has recognized the potential for
inconsistency, and it has adopted an odd approach to addressing the
problem—vary the precedential value of the decisions rendered based
on the process.146 As noted previously in the discussion of the Mississippi State case, negotiated resolutions (in which penalties are determined by the parties to the case, subject to approval by the COI) have no
141. New independent infractions process launches, supra note 124. The bylaws are similarly expansive in outlining a partial list of factors for the Infractions Referral Committee to
take into account in making its referral decision. Those factors include “[a]ctual or perceived
misconduct by the involved parties” and “[i]ncreased stakes, including potential penalties, or
other pressures driving institutional decision-making.” NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, §
19.11.3.1.1. Commentators have seized on another factor—“[l]ack of acceptance of the core
principles of self-governance, such as adversarial posturing or refusal to cooperate,” id.—as
a possible explanation for the referral decision in the Memphis case. See Forde, supra note
133; O’Neil, supra note 139. If the University of Memphis truly was thumbing its nose at the
NCAA by seeking an injunction to allow Wiseman to play, perhaps the IARP is a retaliatory
move by the NCAA. See Forde, supra note 133; O’Neil, supra note 139.
142. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.1.
143. The IARP bylaws do require the Independent Resolution Panel to “[c]oordinate with
the Committee on Infractions, which will monitor compliance with prescribed penalties,” id.
§ 19.11.2.3.5(f), so that may serve as a check to ensure penalty consistency. But the bylaws
also state that “[p]enalties prescribed by the Committee on Infractions . . . in prior infractions
cases shall have no precedential value,” id. § 19.11.5.8.4.1, which suggests the Independent
Resolution Panel has ample latitude to depart from COI precedent.
144. NCAA MISSOURI APPEALS DECISION, supra note 53, at 8.
145. Id. at n.9.
146. See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.11.5.8.4.1.
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precedential value.147 Similarly, the legislation governing the IARP process (in which penalties are determined by an “Independent Resolution
Panel”) specifically states that IARP decisions have no precedential
value.148 Indeed, the IARP scheme even invites Independent Resolution
Panels to ignore prior COI case law: “Penalties prescribed by the Committee on Infractions . . . in prior infractions cases shall have no precedential value.”149
Penalty determinations in summary judgments and following COI
hearings at least are made by the same decisionmaker—the COI—but
the committee may choose to accord little precedential value to a summary judgment. In the Missouri case, the University argued on appeal
that the one-year postseason ban was out of step with prior summary
judgment cases, but the COI responded in part that summary disposition
reports “offer limited precedential value.”150 As the IAC observed, that
position was grounded on a COI “internal operating procedure” which
states that COI panels may view summary judgment decisions “as less
instructive than decisions through the contested hearing process because
the violations through the summary disposition process constitute the
parties’ agreement.”151
Indeed, the Missouri case indicates that the COI can even pick and
choose which parts of a decision have precedential value. 152 Recall that
the COI panel noted in its Missouri decision that historically aggravating
factors of involved individuals have been attributed to the institutions at
which those individuals were employed.153 But the panel chose not to
attribute the tutor’s aggravating factors to the University of Missouri
“based on the nature of the record in this case.”154 The panel then stated
the following: “Because this case is unique, it should not be cited as
precedent in this limited regard.”155
Limiting the precedential value of cases is no way to resolve penalty inconsistencies. The inconsistencies will remain and advocates in
the enforcement process will continue to cite past cases that have facts
similar to the case at hand, regardless of the method by which the past
cases were resolved. Even the COI cites past summary disposition cases
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See supra accompanying note 109; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.5.12.4.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.11.5.8.4.1.
Id.
NCAA MISSOURI APPEALS DECISION, supra note 53, at 7-8.
Id. at 8 n.7.
NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-59; NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS
DECISION, supra note 5, at 11.
154. NCAA MISSOURI INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 5, at 12.
155. Id.
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when it serves the committee’s purposes.156 As the IAC noted in its Missouri decision, while the COI has argued summary judgments offer little
precedential value, the committee “continues to cite summary disposition reports in its analysis and rationale in the infractions process.”157
Such a practice, employed as well by advocates for institutions and involved individuals, simply sows confusion.
Comparisons between cases, in an effort to achieve penalty consistency among similar cases, have always been a major factor in the
determination of penalties and in the review of penalties on appeal.158
Yet the new hodge-podge of case resolution processes, which not only
employ different decisionmakers, but also vary in terms of precedential
value, threatens to undermine penalty consistency—one of the fundamental goals of NCAA rules enforcement. It is no wonder that the IAC
in its Missouri decision offered the following admonition:
This committee believes it is critical for the NCAA membership to
discuss and evaluate . . . the appropriate precedential value and approach for cases in the entirety of the infractions processes. Doing
so would better equip this committee and the Committee on Infractions in discharging its duties, and in turn improve the infractions
process and yield better guidance for the membership as a whole.159

As the comparison between the Missouri and North Carolina cases reveals, it is difficult enough to achieve consistency when NCAA legislation changes to reflect current trends, such as an evolving approach to
academic fraud. It becomes even more difficult when alternative means
of resolution essentially invite inconsistency.
VIII. EXEMPLARY COOPERATION
Before concluding, let’s return to the Missouri case for a brief examination of two final issues. I’ve contended that the penalties imposed
are eminently reasonable under the current bylaws. In particular, the
one-year postseason ban fits neatly within the penalty matrix, even if the
case was classified “Level I-Mitigated,” as the university desired.160

156. NCAA MISSOURI APPEALS DECISION, supra note 53, at 8.
157. Id.
158. In perhaps its most instructive and most influential report, the IAC in a 1994-95 case
involving the University of Mississippi set out the factors the IAC would consider in reviewing COI penalties. NCAA MISSISSIPPI APPEALS REPORT, supra note 43, at 15. Those seven
factors, which guided both the COI and the IAC for nearly two decades, at least until the
penalty matrix was added to the NCAA bylaws in 2013, included “Comparison of the Penalty
or Penalties Imposed”—that is, how the penalty or penalties imposed in the current case “compared with the penalty or penalties imposed in other cases with similar characteristics.” Id.
159. NCAA MISSOURI APPEALS DECISION, supra note 53, at 8.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
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But, as noted, the COI has discretion to depart from the matrix if there
are “extenuating circumstances.”161 Because the COI panel in Missouri
chose not to depart from the matrix, we can conclude that the panel determined that the extenuating circumstances standard had not been met.
Most of the negative commentary regarding the NCAA decisions
in the case, both from Missouri officials and the sports media, highlighted one factor—Missouri’s “exemplary cooperation” after it learned
of the tutor’s misconduct. Critics have argued, at least implicitly, that
exemplary cooperation should meet the extenuating circumstances
standard, and that the COI and IAC decisions will encourage schools not
to cooperate, or even encourage them to hide known violations.162
The extent to which schools should receive “credit” for cooperating
with the NCAA after violations are discovered is such a prominent issue
in infractions cases that I devoted an entire chapter to the issue in my
recent book on NCAA rules enforcement.163 As a membership organization, the NCAA relies upon the voluntary cooperation of its member
institutions when rule violations occur.164 This cooperation is particularly critical when the NCAA enforcement staff has no subpoena power
to compel the cooperation of witnesses.165 So NCAA bylaws impose an
“affirmative obligation” on employees and student-athletes of member
institutions “to cooperate fully with and assist the NCAA enforcement
staff, the Complex Case Unit, the Committee on Infractions, the Independent Resolution Panel and the Infractions Appeals Committee to further the objectives of the Association and its infractions program, including the independent accountability resolution process.”166
In light of this affirmative obligation to cooperate in infractions
matters, how important should it be that university officials fully cooperated after learning of major violations? Should exemplary cooperation
result in reduced penalties, even in an egregious case? In 2007-2008, I
chaired a penalty subcommittee of the COI. One of the subcommittee’s
charges was to consider how cooperation, by both individual and institutional rule-violators, should factor into the resolution of major infractions cases. After hearing from many stakeholders, the subcommittee
recommended a new bylaw stating that “full and complete cooperation
161. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.9.6.
162. Nicole Auerbach, Auerbach: Missouri ruling shows cooperating with the NCAA
doesn’t pay, ATHLETIC (Jan. 31, 2019), https://theathletic.com/794463/2019/01/31/missouritigers-ncaa-infractions-cooperation-tutor-bowl-ban; Dodd & Kercheval, supra note 45; Kelly,
supra note 68; Matter, supra note 70.
163. PARKINSON, supra note 65, at 155-85.
164. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.2.3.
165. PARKINSON, supra note 65, at 157.
166. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.2.3.
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in investigations and in disclosure of violations is an obligation of membership and does not mitigate sanctions imposed on either institutions or
their staff members.”167
The full COI endorsed the proposed bylaw, concluding that because
NCAA legislation already required full cooperation by parties under investigation, giving rule-violators “credit” for cooperation, in the form of
penalty relief, was unfair to schools that complied with the rules.168 The
COI believed that failure to cooperate should result in increased penalties, but doing what one is obligated to do—cooperate—should not reduce penalties.169
Later, however, the COI reversed course. The NCAA enforcement
staff persuaded the COI not to advance the new legislation, arguing that
the committee’s proposal would hamper staff investigations.170 Those
investigations already were hamstrung by a lack of subpoena power and
other investigative limitations.171 So the COI revised its recommendation, and the NCAA leadership settled on a compromise. Schools and
their employees are expected to cooperate and in the general run of cases,
cooperation would not mitigate penalties.172 But if the school’s level of
cooperation rose to “extraordinary” cooperation, it would be a mitigating
factor.173
This is essentially the regime that now exists under the bylaws. If
a school has engaged in “exemplary” cooperation, the COI will recognize those efforts and give weight to them in the imposition of penalties.174 That does not mean, however, that a school will escape harsh
penalties if serious violations have occurred. Exemplary cooperation is
simply one factor in a laundry list of aggravating and mitigating factors
that the COI must consider in fashioning an appropriate set of penalties.175 Yet schools in the dock, like Missouri, will continue to argue that
harsh penalties are improper when schools cooperate fully. Consider
Athletics Director Sterk’s comments following the IAC decision: “I
think the appeals committee came to a point and they said, ‘We can’t
overturn it because it is in this matrix.’ Why in the heck do you have an

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

PARKINSON, supra note 65, at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182-83.
Id.
Id. at 183.
PARKINSON, supra note 65, at 183.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.9.4(f).
See id. §§ 19.9.3-19.9.4.
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appeals process if they can’t overturn a decision like that, where there is
exemplary cooperation?”176
Yes, it’s true, the IAC could not overturn the postseason ban because it was in the matrix.177 But to allow Level I violations that “seriously undermine or threaten the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate
Model,”178 such as academic misconduct, to escape harsh punishment
merely because a school cooperated in an exemplary fashion after violations were discovered would elevate cooperation to an exalted status rather than the substantial mitigating factor the membership intended it to
be.
In the end, NCAA institutions are bound by the membership’s collective judgment, and the NCAA’s public response to Missouri officials’
criticism of the COI and IAC decisions may seem insensitive, but it also
seems to be on point: “While Missouri’s disappointment is understandable, the rules and infractions processes are developed by NCAA members. If any member feels the rules and penalty structure are unfair, there
is a clear path for them to suggest changes. The infractions process was
collectively created and adopted by NCAA members, including Missouri.”179
IX. POSTSEASON BANS AND HARM TO INNOCENT STUDENT-ATHLETES
Finally, the Missouri penalties raise the persistent concern that a
postseason ban unfairly penalizes innocent student-athletes who had no
involvement in violations. In fact, more often than not, by the time a
major infractions case finally is resolved (particularly if there is an appeal), the violations are dated and occurred before many, if not all, of the
institution’s current student-athletes arrived on campus.180 The impact
of postseason sanctions on innocent student-athletes certainly is a consideration that the COI and the IAC must consider in determining
whether penalties are fair and appropriate.181 But the NCAA membership consistently considers the postseason ban to be one of the few tools
in the COI’s sanctions toolbox that has a chance to be an effective

176. Kelly, supra note 68.
177. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, § 19.9.5 (COI panels “shall prescribe core penalties
from the ranges set forth in Figure 19-1”), fig. 19-1.
178. Id. § 19.1.1.
179. Dodd & Kercheval, supra note 45.
180. See, e.g., NCAA MISSOURI APPEALS DECISION, supra note 53, at 18-19.
181. In its prominent 1995 Mississippi report, the IAC listed “Impact of Penalties on Innocent Student-Athletes and Coaches” as a factor it would consider in reviewing COI penalties. NCAA MISSISSIPPI APPEALS REPORT, supra note 43, at 18.
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deterrent.182 The NCAA working group that revised the penalty structure—to include penalty classifications and the penalty matrix, among
other revisions—relied on membership surveys that concluded that (1)
penalties needed to be “more stringent,” and (2) postseason bans and
scholarship restrictions were the most effective deterrents.183
The NCAA membership, then, has accepted the harm to innocent
student-athletes as part of the tradeoff necessary to deter rule violations.184 While that impact on innocents may be regrettable, schools like
Missouri should direct their outrage toward the NCAA membership and
its collectively developed legislation rather than toward the infractions
committees that try to faithfully apply the bylaws handed to them.185 Of
course, where one stands always depends on where one sits. Schools on
the hot seat invariably are opposed to harsh sanctions on themselves,
even in the face of a clear directive from the membership that harsh sanctions must be imposed on the most serious rule violators. As one of the
enforcement working group members stated, “People in general are going to say we need a strong enforcement process and coaches will say
they are behind these changes, but when it comes down to specifics, everyone hates the outcome when it involves them. But the membership
clearly wanted us to take this direction.”186

182. See Gary Brown, Violator Beware: Penalties in new enforcement structure pack a
punch, NCAA (Jan. 9, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/violator-beware-penalties-new-enforcement-structure-pack-punch.
183. Id.
184. Again, the 1995 Mississippi report from the IAC is instructive, summarizing the
NCAA membership’s general approach to the concern:
The institution is correct in its assertion that the penalties imposed in this case will
have an effect on innocent students and coaches. However, it would be impossible
for the Committee on Infractions to carry out its functions and responsibilities under
Bylaw 19.01.1 without having some effect on innocent students and coaches. That
bylaw directs the committee, in imposing penalties, to provide fairness to uninvolved parties. However, the bylaw also makes it clear that the primary mission of
the committee is “to eliminate violations of NCAA rules and impose appropriate
penalties should violations occur.”
NCAA MISSISSIPPI APPEALS REPORT, supra note 43, at 19 (finding the COI achieved the
correct balance in imposing a two-year ban on postseason competition and television appearances).
185. In the spirit of full disclosure, my brother, Larry Parkinson, is currently a member of
the NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions. He served as a member of the hearing panels
for both the Missouri and the Mississippi State cases. We discussed neither case before they
were fully resolved. My views in this article are strictly my own and do not necessarily reflect
the views of my brother or any other member of the COI or IAC.
186. Brown, supra note 182 (quoting working group member Eleanor Myers).
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X. CONCLUSION
The recent University of Missouri infractions case has generated
considerable heat for its purportedly unfair sanctions on the university’s
athletics program, in particular the one-year postseason ban imposed by
the COI and upheld by the IAC. Even a glance at the NCAA’s current
penalty structure, however, suggests that the penalty was appropriate under legislative guidelines. Nonetheless, the case has highlighted significant issues that threaten to further undermine public confidence in the
NCAA’s enforcement processes.
Changes to academic misconduct legislation have left NCAAwatchers flummoxed, as the University of North Carolina skates away
from a massive, two-decade academic fraud scheme while schools like
Missouri receive substantial penalties for much milder misconduct.
Strict penalty guidelines, in the form of a penalty matrix, have rendered
the COI and IAC box-checkers. The NCAA’s addition of negotiated
resolution and the Independent Accountability Resolution Process as alternative means of resolving major infractions cases has introduced multiple actors into the penalty determination process, which invites inconsistency. Further, manipulation of the precedential value of past
infractions decisions adds yet another layer of confusion to the process.
Let’s hope that the NCAA leadership uses the Missouri case as a
springboard for thoughtful reexamination and takes to heart the IAC’s
recommendation in that case to evaluate the appropriate approach to resolving major infractions cases “in the entirety of the infractions processes.”187

187. NCAA MISSOURI APPEALS DECISION, supra note 53, at 8.

